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STRATEGIC DEPTH: CIVILIAN SKILLS IN NATIONAL GUARD BRIGADE COMBAT TEAMS
The Problem
The once stark black-and-white divisions between war and peace have faded.
America's national security apparatus, military and civilian, needs to be more adept in operating along a continuum involving military, political, and economic skills in a gray area that is likely to be persistent. 1 In the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, one of the most important lessons learned, and to a large extent relearned, is that military success alone is not sufficient.
Our efforts must also address economic development, the rule of law, good or at least decent governance, public services and more. These so-called soft capabilities along with military power are indispensable to any lasting success, indeed to victory itself as Clausewitz understood it, which is achieving a political objective. 2 In a whole-of-government approach to conflict resolution, the United States often finds itself limited to using the Department of Defense. Gaps in capacity of U.S. government agencies often push the Department of Defense forward as the most capable instrument in the contingency tool box, even though few national security challenges conform to defense-specific solutions. 3 In fact sometimes DoD finds itself the instrument of only resort. When not the only instrument, it is at least the enabling hub for the rest of government. 4 Current and projected fiscal realities indicate those gaps will continue. So for the foreseeable future the Department of Defense will be the central player in whole-ofgovernment contingencies involving political, economic, military, intelligence, and development resources, as well as civilian resources and methodologies. 5 This paper suggests that the Department of Defense can enhance the "militaryonly" solution by leveraging civilian skills embedded within Army Reserve Component formations, in particular Brigade Combat Teams of the Army National Guard.
Examining national policy, relationship of civilian skills to the military environment,
Reserve Component mobilization training, and in-theater civilian requirements, this paper will conclude that the Army Reserve Components can -in fact, must -leverage Soldiers' civilian skills as force multipliers of "soft power," in addition to accomplishing the assigned mission. Offered herein is a model to that end.
The requirement for the U.S. military to maintain security, provide aid and comfort, begin reconstruction, and stand up local government and public services will not go away. At least in the early phases of any conflict, military commanders will no more be able to rid themselves of these tasks than Eisenhower after securing North Africa in 1943. 6 Recognizing this reality, in 2005 the Department of Defense declared that a core U.S. military mission shall be to conduct stability operations. 7 With proficiency equivalent to combat operations, stability operations capabilities shall include: establish civil security and civil control; restore or provide essential services; repair critical infrastructure; and provide humanitarian assistance. 8 In the event civilians are not prepared to perform those tasks, military forces will assume that responsibility. There's a high degree of leverage when we put civilians out. You don't put civilians out in groups of 50 or a hundred. They go in groups of two to 10 to 15. They're surrounded by locally employed staff, by Afghan nationals who are working in a civilian capacity, and by NGO staff who are working in a civilian capacity. There's roughly a 10-to-1 ratio so that when we deploy a thousand civilians, there's an effort of roughly 10,000 civilians that's the total force in place. 24 Secretary of Defense Gates also has acknowledged the importance of even a few civilians:
. Means to those ends include increased Afghan income, increased jobs throughout the vertical market/business chain (that is from the field to the dinner plate), increased productivity of both crops and animals, conservation of natural resources, and so forth. 41 The ADTs ensure that improvements are sustainable with local assets and are within the capabilities of the Afghan Ministries of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock. Army Civil Affairs Soldiers address the civilian capacity shortfall, yet Civil Affairs operations, too, are significantly constrained by current operations tempo.
In today's era of persistent conflict, so often waged in the people's environment, we must wield all national capability and capacity. Provincial Reconstruction, Civil
Affairs and Agribusiness Development Teams are effective but cannot meet all demand for "soft" power in theater. The United States still has untapped "soft" resources -the civilian skills within our Reserve Component units -which we can and should leverage.
Current and future operations demand nothing less.
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